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- ART. VII. — 1. *The History of Ten Years, 1830 – 1840, or France under Louis Philippe.* By LOUIS BLANC. Philadelphia : Lea & Blanchard. 1848. 2 vols. 12mo.
2. *The Three Days of February, 1848, with Sketches of Lamartine, Guizot, etc.* By PERCY B. ST. JOHN, an Eyewitness of the whole Revolution. New York : George P. Putnam. 1848. 16mo. pp. 246.
3. *The Organization of Labor.* By LOUIS BLANC. Translated from the French. London : H. G. Clarke & Co. 1848. 18mo. pp. 122.
4. *France and England, a Vision of the Future.* By M. DE LAMARTINE. [First published in 1843.] Translated from the French. Fifth Edition. London : H. G. Clarke & Co. 1848. 18mo. pp. 155.

THE history of the last six months in Europe is crowded with events of startling interest and significance. The peace of the Continent, which had remained undisturbed for more than sixteen years, was broken by the roar of another revolution in Paris, and the sound had hardly reached the great cities of Italy and Germany before they too broke out in insurrection, and the people everywhere triumphed over their rulers. The oldest thrones have toppled down, empires have been dismembered, kings have surrendered their dearest prerogatives almost without a struggle, and the will of the people in its broadest sense is now the dominant power in Europe. The right arm of despotism is broken, and the freedom of nations is established from the Baltic to the Mediterranean, and from the confines of Russia and Turkey to the Atlantic. If hereditary rule continues to exist, it is only by the sufferance of the governed, who have either a lingering attachment for time-honored names and ancient institutions, or are fearful of the consequences of sweeping political experiments. The revolutionary storm has been so sudden and violent, and the excitement so great, that the people have had no opportunity to calculate their movements, or to decide on the magnitude of the changes which they wished to effect. They need now to pause and consider whither the pressure of events and the agitation of the moment are hurrying them. Enough has been done to give them full security of power to accomplish more, whenever

they shall deem it expedient. France is already a republic, Louis Philippe and his family are in exile, Lombardy and Sicily are independent, Metternich, the high-priest of despotism, is a fugitive, and every monarch in Italy and Germany has yielded all that his subjects asked, and confessed in fact that he holds his throne only by their permission.

But liberty has not been bought without its price. Few lives, however, have been sacrificed; one of the most extraordinary features in the history of these wonderful revolutions is, that they have been accomplished with so little violence and bloodshed. There was a number of petty conflicts in the streets of Paris between the lowest portion of the populace and the Municipal Guards; but the troops of the line and the National Guard, on the one hand, and the great body of the people on the other, appear to have been passive spectators of the struggle. Not a single person of note, not an officer of any rank, fell in the several encounters; and the whole number of killed and wounded was less than half as large as in the Revolution of 1830. In Berlin, the conflict was more general and bloody; but it lasted only one day, and the number of victims does not seem to have exceeded one or two hundred; while in Vienna, the emperor yielded almost at the first show of revolt. Only at Milan and in Sicily, where foreign troops fought against the native population, was the loss of life considerable. Everywhere else, the triumph of the people was almost bloodless; the troops either refused to act against them, or were believed not to be trustworthy. Here is the great gain which has been made by the popular cause; despots in future can place little confidence in their armies. A military conqueror, who has gained the implicit affection of his soldiers by often leading them to victory, and by sharing their perils, is now alone to be dreaded.

Still, in the loss of public credit and the depression of the funds, in commercial failures, the check given to manufacturing industry, and the consequent loss of employment by large classes of the population, in the distrust and anxiety which prevail, in the uncertainty as to the course and tendency of the popular governments, and in the dread of a general war, the people have been made to pay a high price for their freedom. In former times, such consequences as these would not have been widely felt; individuals might

suffer, but the bulk of the community wholly escaped the disaster. But in these days, the social interests of nations are knit together in one vast web by the ramifications of commerce, and the whole fabric is maintained only by public credit and the confidence which every man reposes in his neighbour. Withdraw these frail and delicate supports, and the whole structure tumbles to the ground, in a ruin which every member of society has sufficient reason to lament. This time, France has been the greatest sufferer ; she appears destined, as on many former occasions, to teach political wisdom to other nations through her own woful experience. Never, since the failure of Law's famous Mississippi scheme in the early part of the last century, have commercial disaster and bankruptcy been so prevalent. From this cause alone, the high-wrought hopes of the common people, who looked to find their social condition ameliorated by their political emancipation, are probably doomed to a bitter disappointment. Political changes gratify only the wills and passions of men ; measures which tend to the general improvement of the social state, and to the elevation of the laboring classes, are very slow in their operation, and will not work at all except in times of peace and tranquillity ; a revolutionary period is always one of suffering.

But the evil most to be feared is the breaking out of a general war in Europe, which will be all the more obstinate and destructive because inflamed by popular passion, and waged in fact by the people themselves, and not merely by their rulers. Already the contest has begun in Lombardy and Holstein, and the powers which are nearest to the scene are uneasy spectators of the fray. Before these lines are published, half of the continent may be parties to the strife. Republican France has already largely increased her armies, and directed a portion of them towards her frontiers. Russia stands, armed to the teeth, over prostrate and exhausted Poland, and threatens to strike the moment that an arm is extended to raise her suffering vassal. Proud of her semi-barbarous but gigantic strength, relieved from all dread of intestine commotions, as it is part of the national religion to reverence the Czar, and prosperous in her finances, she looks without fear upon the convulsive efforts of republicanism beyond her borders, and rather courts than shuns attack. The struggle must soon come, unless averted

by the offices of England, whose situation enables her to mediate effectually for all Europe, while her welfare, if not her safety, depends on the preservation of peace. Staggering under the burden of her present debt and enormous taxes, the scale of war expenditure would be her ruin ; it would either lead to national bankruptcy, or would give vent to the mutinous spirit which even now stirs the immense mass of her proletary population. France, on the other hand, may think that her safety consists in turning the effervescence of the popular mind against a foreign rather than a domestic foe. The republican spirit is essentially warlike and aggressive, — a truth which is sadly proved by the past history and present attitude of our own government. National prejudices and animosities are readily called forth and exasperated in the unrestrained license of public discussion. Patriotism is a convenient substitute for all other political virtues, and a demagogue can furnish no easier proof of it than by uttering constant invectives against a rival government. And when, as in France, the spirit of nationality is ardent and universal, and the passion for military glory, naturally intense, has been fostered within the present century by a long train of the most brilliant exploits in war that the world has ever witnessed, though these were followed by reverses equally signal, the outbreak of hostilities, now that the popular will has thrown off all restraint, seems almost inevitable. The present generation is fiercely emulous of the glories of Marengo and Austerlitz, and frantic in its desire to wipe out the stains of Waterloo.

These are but the most obvious of the reflections suggested by the present excited state of Europe ; but they are enough to qualify very seriously the exultation we might otherwise feel in the triumph of republican principles. The worst evil of despotism is, that the passage from it to rational freedom is so long, rugged, and dangerous. Through financial disaster, anarchy, and bloodshed, through popular tumults and the terrors of military domination, through the ruin of the wealthier classes and the more bitter and protracted sufferings of the poor, lies the only practical road from political servitude to universal emancipation. After the first insensate shout of joy had been uttered on the reception of the news from France, there was hardly a reflecting person in this country who did not feel his spirit sink within him, as he

waited with anxiety, and almost with consternation, for further intelligence from Europe. The revolution of 1789 had left its terrible mark on the memory of nations ; the horrors of the five succeeding years, the reign of terror at Paris, the sanguinary wars and political agitations, from which even the intervention of the Atlantic did not preserve our distant land, were not easy to be forgotten. We remembered, also, that the six years which followed the final recognition by Great Britain of our own independence were years of confusion, uncertainty, and distress, of jealousy and dissension between the States and commotions among the people, which were so harassing and long continued, that many of the firmest patriots began to look back with regret on the earlier and more quiet period of our colonial vassalage. The establishment of our Federal Constitution brought order and prosperity out of this chaos ; but as the adoption of this instrument by each State was in fact a yielding up to an external government of that unlimited freedom which it had vindicated against the mother country, and in so far was a surrender of a portion of our liberties for the greater security of the remainder, the Constitution was everywhere violently opposed, and could not probably have gone into effect, if the austere virtues and surpassing personal influence of Washington had not reconciled the people to this great sacrifice. Will the republicans of Europe have moral firmness enough thus to tie their own hands, to set bounds and limits to their new possession of freedom, and to render to law and justice that authority which they have wrested from hereditary monarchs ? Are they more likely to find a Washington or a Bonaparte at the head of their armies ?

It would be idle to speculate upon the future, as history affords no parallel to this grand upheaval of the nations, this rupture of all the political ties which have hitherto held the civilized portion of Europe together ; there is no experiment on record the results of which can guide our judgment. The fountains of the great deep are broken up, and no one can tell where the waves of the inundation will be stayed. But we cannot bring ourselves to augur ill from the movement in Italy and Germany. We cannot deplore a revolution which has opened the dungeons of the Spielberg, has swept away the last foul traces of the Holy Alliance, has given once more a voice to freedom at the Roman forum, and has

annihilated the mean and hateful tyranny of that imbecile branch of the Bourbons which has so long misgoverned Naples. The breaking up of the Austrian empire, that conglomerate of dissimilar races which had no principle of unity but despotism, and was held together only by the iron bands of military restraint, affords as little cause for sorrow as any lover of humanity and freedom would find in the expulsion of the Turks from the shores of the Bosphorus and the reëstablishment of the cross on the domes of St. Sophia. What affinity has Hungary with Lombardy, or Bohemia with the Tyrol, or Galicia with Styria, or what right, save that of the strongest, had Austria to govern either of these provinces, and to carry her odious police, censorship, and restriction of personal liberty into them all? The evils of despotism in these countries were of such crying magnitude, that any trials and sufferings which liberty may bring with it will seem easy to bear in comparison.

And there are elements of hope which lighten the horizon of freedom in Italy and central Europe. A strong tendency has already shown itself towards the formation of two great federative empires or republics, the one embracing all of Italian, the other all of German descent. The regeneration of Poland might add a third, a Sclavonic union, which would take in the eastern provinces of Austria, and thus be strong enough to hold even the colossal power of Russia in check. The examples of Switzerland and the United States are enough to prove, that the reconciliation of liberty with peace and law can be more easily effected in a federation than in any centralized government. The elements of discord between the constituent states are repressed by the common desire for the preservation of tranquillity, and the innovating or turbulent disposition of any one is kept down by the opposing interests of the majority. Party spirit loses much of its distracting and disturbing power, when scattered among many centres of action, instead of coming to a focus at one point. The several states are checks upon each other, and the federal government has a moderate control over all, not sufficient to excite jealousy or to serve as a means of oppression, but strong enough to hold the balance even between them. The limited grant of power to this federal head also renders it less an object of ambition or attack, and political agitation expends its force in the limbs before reach-

ing the heart of the system. The state of political dependence or tutelage, moreover, in which most of the provinces and smaller kingdoms of Italy and Germany have long been held, favors the introduction of such a federal union, as it has prepared the minds of all for acting in concert, and for surrendering to a central government that portion of authority which is needed for the common defence and the preservation of the general welfare. The Customs-Union has paved the way for the success of such a system in Germany, and the restoration of her ancient unity and independence to the Italian peninsula has long been a favorite idea of the Italian patriots. Austria alone would be likely to oppose this distribution of power, since Prussia would certainly be preferred to her as the head of the German confederation; but when stripped of the provinces that have been joined to her only by compulsion, Austria would become only a fourth-rate power, and could offer no effectual resistance.

It may appear fanciful to some, this idea of the formation of three great confederacies occupying the centre and the south of Europe, each enjoying the largest measure of political freedom and social equality that is consistent with the preservation of property and law, and strong enough to hold both France and Russia in check, and to prevent a collision between them. But when the ancient landmarks are removed, and the old political arrangements are whelmed beneath the waters of revolution, community of race, natural boundaries, national spirit, and the desire for preserving the balance of power and the largest means of internal and foreign communication, would be strong inducements for the creation of such a system as we have indicated. Either Germany or Italy, perhaps both, if disunited and weakened by internal commotions, would fall a prey to the martial prowess of France, and to her insatiable thirst for foreign conquest and dominion. If hurried into long and devastating wars before the elements of civil liberty are consolidated at home, the power which has just been wrested from their hereditary rulers will gradually steal back into the same hands, or be clutched in the stern gripe of some military adventurer. Or if this danger be avoided, a still greater one is in prospect, — that of being governed, or rather kept in constant anarchy, by the populace of the great cities, which is in fact to fall a prey to the despotism of a mob.

The common people of Germany, especially in the north, are educated and intelligent, and so far better fitted for freedom than the working classes either of France or England; but while quite ready to vindicate their own political rights, their respect for those of other people is wholly subservient to their desire for national aggrandizement. Thus the Prussians are now free, but they fight desperately to keep their share of unhappy Poland in subjection. Austria has shaken off her chains, but Austrian troops are still disputing every inch of ground in Lombardy. The mere populace of Berlin and Vienna have but to say the word, and the troops would instantly be withdrawn from Posen and the Venetian territory, leaving to the native population of those places the privilege of selecting their own government. So it will ever be; kings alone are not to be reproached for mad ambition and the inconsistency of their professions.

But leaving these rather uncertain speculations, let us look more particularly at France, or rather at Paris, the hot-bed of revolutions, whence this mighty impulse came that has shaken the civilized world to its centre, and threatens still to hoist the republican flag in almost every city in Europe. In one respect, certainly, the overthrow of the late French government affords no cause for regret. We have little sympathy for the misfortunes of Louis Philippe, though they have thickened upon him suddenly in his old age, and though his fall was instantaneous from a state of almost imperial grandeur to one of abject weakness and humiliation. He deserved them all by his life of cold and undeviating selfishness. His administration was one long intrigue for the advancement of his family and himself; and sometimes, as in the case of the Spanish marriages, the trickery was so mean and gross, and the breach of faith so obvious, that his majesty appeared much like a crafty old swindler. He had the usual luck of a cunning person, as it is now obvious enough that in this operation he overreached himself; he forfeited the good-will of England and the respect of his own subjects, and thus weakened the moral basis of his dynasty without at all increasing its material supports. During a reign of seventeen years, in which, in spite of constitutional restrictions, his real authority and influence were immense, he did little for his country, little for the moral and intellectual elevation of his people, and nothing for the gradual improvement of the political institu-

tions of the kingdom, because his time and attention were absorbed in seeking splendid foreign alliances for his children, and in manœuvring to maintain a supple majority in the Chambers, and to keep those ministers at the head of affairs who would second most heartily his private designs. In his favor it may be said, that he was unwilling to shed blood even for the gravest political crimes, and that he was sincerely desirous of maintaining the peace of Europe ; we are unwilling to deny him any credit for these virtues, though both tended to the security of his throne. Some allowance should also be made for a monarch who had escaped as if by a miracle from repeated attempts at assassination, and who could not go ten steps from his palace in safety except under an immense guard and with horses at full speed. He had gained some reputation for personal courage by the coolness he had shown on all occasions when his life was aimed at, but lost it all by his lamentable vacillation and pusillanimity on the last three days of his reign. The throne which he had gained without any merit of his own, and held for so long a time without conferring one substantial benefit upon his people, was finally lost by an utter lack of energy and manliness. His ignoble flight from France, showing extreme terror when no man pursued him, was the fit termination of his political career.

It may seem that we have spoken of Louis Philippe's character with undue severity, considering his present humiliation and the bitterness of his misfortunes. It might be so, if these misfortunes were such as too often come upon fallen monarchs. But not a hair of his head has been injured, every member of his family is safe, one of them still occupies a throne, and he is himself living at ease in a private palace, suffering nothing but mortification for the loss of a throne and a fortune which he had not earned, but had long enjoyed and abused. We see nothing in such a position to deter one from pointing out the moral of his story, — and it is full of meaning for sovereigns, — without any mixture of sentimental regret. If he had been a bigot, like Charles X., or a simpleton, like some of his royal ancestors, his case might justly have claimed more sympathy. But his eyes were neither blinded by passion, nor obscured by ignorance or prejudice ; his faults proceeded not from a bad head, but from a cold heart, and as such, they have the least right to be considered with leniency.

But it concerns the honor of France to restore their private fortunes to him and his family. Whatever may be said of the Orleans possessions as once the property of the state, we see not what pretence there is for confiscating the fortune bequeathed to D^uAumale by the Duc de Bourbon, and it is not seemly that the old age of one who has so long occupied the throne should be passed in penury, or made dependent on the bounty of England.

But the personal character of a constitutional sovereign does not wholly determine the nature of the government, and it remains to be considered whether the late revolution in France was either politic or just, whether it was needed or called for by the vast majority of the people, and whether it is likely to elevate the character or promote the welfare of the whole nation. A wide distinction is to be made between the case of the French and that of every other people in Europe who have recently revolted against their monarchs. Throughout Italy and Germany, the popular movement was directed against royal authority which was nearly or quite despotic, and which in most instances had been shamefully abused. The kings had bound heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, upon the necks of their subjects, and the people rose to vindicate the natural rights of humanity against arbitrary and irresponsible power. The freedom of the press and of public discussion was denied to them; they had no voice in determining the amount of taxes which they were obliged to pay, or the purposes to which the funds thus raised should be applied; they were forced to maintain the troops and the police, who were kept up for no other purpose than that of retaining the people themselves in subjection; and if they had not in every case to complain of immediate oppression more galling still, at least they had no security against it for the future.

But not one of these grievances existed in France. For seventeen years, if not ever since the fall of Napoleon, the personal freedom of the French people had been secured by just and moderate laws, and equitable tribunals, of whose decisions there was no complaint, and they had enjoyed as large a measure of political privileges as was compatible with the existence of a monarchy. We say nothing of the extension of the right of suffrage, because the evidence makes it very doubtful whether the majority of the people desired it, or

spent any thought upon the matter ; and because, at any rate, this ostensible purpose of the insurgents was fully secured the day before the revolution actually took place. The government which the populace of Paris has just overthrown was one which they had themselves constituted but a few years before, after a revolution had placed the whole power in their hands, and when they imposed every restriction upon the authority of the monarch chosen by themselves, and took every security for their future liberties, which they considered necessary. The right to print and publish their opinions, of whatever nature, without previous examination or approval, was fully secured to them by the charter, and there is no pretence that it was ever violated ; how fully it was exercised one may learn from the files of such newspapers at Paris as *La Réforme*, *Le National*, and *Le Bon Sens*, the columns of which have been filled for years with the most vehement and scurrilous attacks upon the king and the government, with direct advocacy of republican institutions, and with scarcely veiled incentives to sedition and revolt. The tone of political discussions in the newspapers, either in England or this country, is not remarkable for moderation or decency ; but we have never seen any thing in the English language to match the malignity, the concentrated bitterness and hate, with which these Parisian journals kept up their warfare upon the government. Occasionally the patience of the ministers gave way, and they caused the editors to be prosecuted for sedition and libel ; but the slight punishments inflicted did nothing to lessen the evil, and of late years prosecutions have been but seldom instituted. So tolerant was the administration, that professors at the colleges, like Michelet and Quinet, were allowed to turn their public lectures into mere popular harangues in favor of republicanism, seasoned with constant insinuations and invectives against the government ; and still they held their offices and received their salaries from the state.

But we need no other proof of the forbearance of the French government than is afforded by the free publication, with the author's name attached, of Louis Blanc's famous *Histoire de Dix Ans*, of which a well-executed translation is now before us. It is a bitter political pamphlet under the guise of a history, written with amazing spirit and talent, but with so much ferocity of purpose and unfairness of statement, boldly advo-

cating the most atrocious opinions in politics, morals, and social economy, and making such gross and calumnious charges against the character of Louis Philippe and every minister who has held office under him, that the writing of it might well be considered an outrage upon public decency, and punished as such with the utmost severity of the law. That mysterious affair of the old Duc de Bourbon's suicide, in August, 1830, is detailed with great minuteness, the facts being exaggerated or suppressed with malignant skill, and dark insinuations thrown in, so as to cast upon the king, against all the medical and legal authorities who examined the case, the horrid suspicion of having caused his aged relative to be murdered in order to secure a vast inheritance for his son. Every rebellion which took place in Paris and Lyons during these ten years, if we may believe Louis Blanc, was caused by the police, acting under the order of the ministers, who secretly instigated and got up the revolt, that they might crush the republican party at a blow ; and yet, with blind inconsistency, he details all the movements, projects, and hopes of the conspirators, so as to demonstrate that the insurrection was solely their work. That the author of such a book was not even prosecuted affords pretty good proof that the government respected the liberty of the press. Any jury in this country would convict its writer of libel without leaving their seats.

But it is idle to dwell upon the point, that there was nothing like immediate oppression, or the direct exercise of tyrannical power, by the late government of France. There may have been corruption, servility, and baseness in the administration ; the conduct of the ministers may have been fluctuating and unwise in the direction of foreign affairs, improvident and wasteful in the management of the finances. These are faults which the opposition always lays to the charge of the party in power, be it in a monarchy or a republic. The remedy for them is to turn out the corrupt and incapable ministry, and put in a virtuous and able one ; not to get up a rebellion, and overthrow the constitution, which dates only from yesterday, and was itself the fruit of a former revolution, and the work of the people themselves. Under the charter of 1830, every Frenchman was secure in the enjoyment of his life and property, and free in the management of his concerns ; all were equal before the law ; and toleration of opinion, whether

in politics or religion, was complete. Though the populace now rule in Paris, the late ministers of France, we believe, might safely return thither without danger even of arrest; no man has aught to allege against them, in respect either to the arbitrary exercise of their power, or to their violation of law. The king himself was contemptuously dismissed, not an arm being raised against his person; he had not attacked the lives or property of his subjects, or broken the charter, but had often mitigated the rigor of the law, and saved those whom the tribunals had adjudged to death.

But we go much farther; France was eminently prosperous under Louis Philippe, and the condition of all classes of her people was steadily improving. She was at peace with the civilized world, her commerce and manufactures were flourishing, her peasantry easy and contented in their circumstances, order reigned in her cities, and though the professed politicians were angry and turbulent, and the newspapers held violent and exciting language, the mass of the people paid no heed to them, but quietly attended to their own concerns. Taxation was heavy, but it was equally distributed, no classes being exempted from its pressure, but all sharing the burden alike.

As to the great increase, during the late reign, of the annual expenditure and the national debt, of which so much has been said, there was an obvious reason for it, which puts the whole responsibility, not on the government, but the people. The support of the colony in Algeria, and the interminable war with Abd-el-Kader, were a constant and immense drain upon the finances, and a mere sacrifice to the popular appetite for military glory and foreign possessions. That the Mediterranean was to become a French lake was the glittering pretension with which the popularity-hunting politicians of the day, especially the republicans and radicals, tickled the ears of the populace. The assertion was often made, and we have no doubt of its truth, that the king and the ministry would gladly have abandoned this costly and unprofitable possession to the Arabs, who were its rightful owners, or at most have retained the city of Algiers as a mere military post, just as the English hold Gibraltar. But they dared not do it, the people would not hear of it; and so an army of a hundred thousand men was maintained there, to wage an inglorious war with a few Arabs, and make bootless expeditions into

the desert, the whole expense of the colony and the war, which was immense, being as much a sacrifice to the national vanity as if it had been wasted on the funeral of Napoleon, or some other popular clap-trap. The Algerian war was the peculiar misfortune of Louis Philippe's finances, for as the conquest was achieved just as he came to the throne, and the war was ended by the capture of Abd-el-Kader just as he was driven from it, its cost was a burden on his administration alone.

Still, admitting all that can be said for the generally liberal and equitable character of the late government, and the freedom and prosperity which the people enjoyed under it, it may be asked if we deny the right of that people to substitute a republic for a monarchy, if they see fit, and to accomplish that object even by violence, if resistance should be offered, however doubtful may be the result of the experiment. Certainly not; we are stout adherents of the broad republican doctrine, that society exists only for the public good, and of course, that all its institutions, government included, are subservient to that end, and are to be moulded according to the ascertained will of a majority of the people, who alone are able to determine in what that good consists. If they should decide in favor of a republic, a limited monarchy, or a despotism, — the Russians would unquestionably choose the last, — their will is to be carried into effect. A republic is not so desirable *per se*, that it ought to be imposed upon a nation contrary to its wishes, and in spite of its resistance; to force it upon them by violence would be tyranny, and an infraction of the first principle of republicanism, which is, that the majority of the whole people, or their duly accredited representatives, must always govern. And as the whole community, or the major part of it, — which, in case of a difference of opinion, is the nearest possible approach to the whole, — can institute, so it has also a right to change, the form of government, whenever the lapse of time or the progress of events shall make an alteration desirable.

But the measure of sympathy and respect to which the authors of a revolution are entitled from the lovers of freedom throughout the world will depend on the character of their motives for making the change, on the magnitude of the exigency which called for it, on the courage, wisdom, and fortitude which they displayed in the movement, and on the comparative merits of the system which they pulled down,

and of that which they established in its place. With our whole hearts we admire and applaud those who, under a fearful risk and with great personal sacrifices, have striven to shake off the yoke of oppression, to lift up the downtrodden and helpless, and to give a voice to freedom throughout the land. If they succeed, they are founders of liberty ; if they fail, they are martyrs to it ; and in either case, their names shall be remembered with honor throughout future generations. But the practised adepts in revolution, whose fickle and restless natures find no delight but in constant change, who rebel when there is no oppression and vapor when there is no danger, who are for ever tampering with the foundations of society, and give industry, peace, and religion no opportunity to do their appropriate work, who treat government as if it were a castle of cards, and play with constitutions as dirty children do with mimic fortifications in a mud-puddle, must not be permitted to steal the glory which waits on the true lovers of freedom and the real benefactors of their countrymen and their race. "The all-atoning name of Liberty" cannot hide their recklessness and folly, nor long avert their downfall and their shame.

"Those who know what virtuous liberty is cannot bear to see it disgraced by incapable heads, on account of their having high-sounding words in their mouths. Grand, swelling sentiments of liberty I am sure I do not despise. They warm the heart ; they enlarge and liberalize our minds ; they animate our courage in a time of conflict. Old as I am, I read the fine raptures of Lucan and Corneille with pleasure. Neither do I wholly condemn the little arts and devices of popularity. They facilitate the carrying of many points of moment ; they keep the people together ; they refresh the mind in its exertions ; and they diffuse occasional gayety over the severe brow of moral freedom. Every politician ought to sacrifice to the graces, and to join compliance with reason. But in such an undertaking as that in France, all these subsidiary sentiments and artifices are of little avail. To make a government requires no great prudence. Settle the seat of power, teach obedience, and the work is done. To give freedom is still more easy. It is not necessary to guide ; it only requires to let go the rein. But to form a *free government*, that is, to temper together these opposite elements of liberty and restraint in one consistent work, requires much thought, deep reflection, a sagacious, powerful, and combining mind. This I do not find in those who take the lead in the National Assembly. Per-

haps they are not so miserably deficient as they appear. I rather believe it. It would put them below the common level of human understanding. But when the leaders choose to make themselves bidders at an auction of popularity, their talents in the construction of the state will be of no service. They will become flatterers instead of legislators; the instruments, not the guides, of the people." — *Burke's Reflections on the Revolution.*

Our only point is, that the mere expulsion of the former government, and the establishment of a republic in France, through a sudden outbreak of the populace in Paris, when considered in itself alone, affords no cause of rejoicing to the lovers of free institutions. As yet, it is a mere experiment, which may turn out well or ill, according as the people show more or less wisdom in the future exercise of that power which they have taken into their own hands. As yet, it has redressed no evil, righted no injustice, and furnished no new element of national prosperity. The leaders of the movement were not actuated by a hatred of tyranny, or by a regard for the sufferings of the people, for the country was never more free or prosperous than when they began their revolt; they incurred little or no risk, as the event has shown, except from the consequences of their own success. They had no dungeon-doors to open, there was not one prisoner of state to be set free. They have recently banished all the members of the late royal family, but there was no person for them to recall from banishment. Instead of lightening the burden of taxation, one of their first measures was to decree an additional impost of 45 *per cent.* The only attempt made during the last year, in Paris, to destroy a newspaper press and punish an editor for the free expression of his opinions, was one in which the populace were themselves engaged, several weeks after the revolution took place; and the destined victim of this outrage was the very man who presented the act of abdication to Louis Philippe, and persuaded him to sign it. Every writer and orator in France has been free for many years to advocate republicanism as much as he saw fit; but since the 24th of February, it is only "with whispered breath and bated humbleness" that a few presses attached to the late government venture to hint their distrust or dislike of the change. Compare the tone of the *Journal des Debats* now with that which the *National* assumed during the last ten years under the late king, and then judge whether the Revo-

lution has promoted the liberty of discussion and the freedom of the press.

The truth is, as Louis Blanc himself confesses, that the republican party in France, ever since the revolution of 1830, has been in "a decided minority." They had nothing to rely upon but the unpopularity of the king, the timorous character of the *bourgeoisie*, or middling classes, who form the bulk of the population, and their own audacity. They seem to have no strength among the small proprietors in the country, most of whom cultivate their own lands, and deprecate any change which may disturb the public tranquillity. In the cities they have brought the working people to their aid, not by offering them a republic, which had no attractions for such persons, but by promising them a social revolution, a new organization of labor, fewer hours of work, and higher pay. Still, after these deceptive promises had filled their ranks with those who had nothing to lose but their lives, and who had little to fear even in this respect, through the oft-tried clemency or timidity of the government, they found themselves outnumbered by the shopkeepers and the multitude of small capitalists whom the democratic law for dividing inheritances had called into being, and who were arrayed against them through fear of the very measures which they had held out as incitements for the laborers to join their party. Property is now so equally divided in France, that to menace the holders of it is to create more enemies than friends. The republicans found out this to their cost in the long conspiracy which they kept up during the whole reign of Louis Philippe, and in the several insurrections that they attempted, all of which were put down with the consent, if not the aid, of the National Guard, the armed force of the *bourgeoisie*. Armand Carrel, the first and far the ablest leader of these speculative and daring agitators, the true children of the *Montagnards* of the last century, perished in a duel in 1836, after his spirit had been entirely broken by repeated failures, and he had already begun in good sooth "to despair of the republic." No one appeared to fill his place, though a crowd of journalists and *avocats* have been ambitious of it, among the most conspicuous of whom is Louis Blanc, a writer of singular vigor and eloquence, daring and decisive from mere lack of foresight, but of no judgment or capacity in action. His History of the Ten Years from 1830 to 1840

might be called *The Confessions of the Republican Party in France* ; it unveils their weakness and fanaticism, their recklessness of human life and their insane passion for the military glory of their country, their hatred of the middling classes much more than of the feeble remains of the aristocracy, and their frantic desire to revive that old Jacobin party, whose deeds, little more than half a century ago, astonished and terrified Europe. This work, with Lamartine's recent *History of the Girondists*, forms the literature of the last revolution, both having powerfully contributed to its success.

Too feeble in numbers to make any direct attempt against the government, the republicans have acted of late years in concert with the dynastic opposition, as it is called, but have retained their distinct organization and purposes, and "bided their time," in the hope, which has at last been fulfilled, that the agitating movements of this party would bring about a crisis which their own superior daring and energy might turn to account even to the total overthrow of the monarchy. These were the tactics of a small but resolute party, who looked to the accomplishment of their own ends without reference to the wishes of the country. In France alone could such a scheme have any chance of success ; for Paris is France, and a revolution in the capital left no power of resistance in the provinces ; the dynasty here depended on the success or failure of the outbreak of a mob, — but of a mob as well trained in all the manœuvres of street-fighting and barricades as regular armies are to the siege of fortresses. The opposition, led by such men as Thiers and Odillon Barrot, both of whom had been in the ministry under the late king, were desirous of reform, but not of revolution ; for, indeed, a direct attack upon the monarchy would have perilled their own seats in the Chamber. But desire of office was probably their ruling motive, for it is difficult to credit the sincerity of men who are constantly changing their alleged causes of complaint, and adopting with every new year a new watchword or note on which to sound the alarm to the people.

At first, they declaimed against the construction of railroads by private companies, though this was the practice both in Great Britain and the United States ; they desired that the state should monopolize all public works. Then they

attempted to drive France into a war with England on the question about the settlement of the East ; and the agitation which they excited on this popular topic was so great, that for a time war seemed inevitable, and preparations for it were made at immense cost. The prudent or wily policy of the king averted this disaster. The questions about the *dotation* of the Duc de Nemours, and the fortifications of Paris, furnished successive themes of attack upon the ministry, but soon passed away, or the opposition changed sides respecting them, or were silenced by acquiescence in their demands. Not till 1846 was the great matter of electoral reform seriously taken up, and made the *cheval de bataille* of all parties opposed to the court. If the great body of the people had cared any thing about this measure, is it possible that the discussion of it should have been so long delayed ? Parliamentary reform was the unceasing demand of the English opposition for forty years before it was granted.

But vacillating as was the policy of the dynastic opposition, they hesitated long before forming a coalition with the republicans, so completely had this small party discredited themselves with the country at large through their violent proceedings. Thiers had forced himself into the ministry during short periods, — we speak now only of the years subsequent to 1837, — and did not wish to break entirely with the king. Odillon Barrot openly avowed his determination not to act with a party which relied only on physical force, and wished to destroy instead of reforming the monarchy. Louis Blanc speaks thus of the radicals at the close of 1837.

“ For a long while, as we have seen, the course of the democratic party had been governed by impulses of generous self-devotedness, of impatient hatred, or of a recklessly venturous spirit ; but its passions, even the most generous of them, had done it hurt. Of all the swords drawn in days of wrath, not one but was turned against it, not one but lacerated it. At last, then, the party were forced to own, that, under the dominion of the *bourgeoisie*, the chances were not all on the side of daring, and that fortune was hardly to be won by force. Nevertheless, it was not disheartened ; but, rising superior to its disasters, by virtue of its unconquerable will, it resolved to be calm and patient in its attacks, and to vanquish solely with the weapons of the law, solely by intellectual efforts.” — *History of Ten Years*, Vol. II. p. 522.

The first coalition between the republicans and the dynastic opposition was formed in the autumn of 1837, when a joint central committee was established by them in Paris, "for the purpose of attending to the elections." This step led to the overthrow of the Molé ministry in March, 1839, though many of the opposition repudiated the alliance with the radicals. Odillon Barrot published a note declaring that he could not act with a committee into which the republican party had entered with colors flying. Royer Collard, respected by all parties, formally condemned the coalition; Lamartine harangued against it from the tribune in the Chamber of Deputies, and defended the ministry. "What is the worst you have to apprehend from royalty?" he exclaimed. "A *coup d'état*, that is to say, a crime. You know whether such a crime remains more than three days unpunished." Guizot, to his eternal disgrace, entered into the alliance, and even advocated a warlike policy, which is always popular in France, while the court was firm in maintaining peaceful relations with all Europe; but he failed to profit by the success of the coalition, and it was only after he had returned to his old friends of the *Centre*, that he was again carried into the ministry. By his ultimate triumph over the coalesced parties, and by his long continuance in office, he drove Thiers, Barrot, and their adherents into a closer union with the republicans, and thus paved the way for the revolution of 1848. The dynastic opposition would never have coöperated heartily with a party so feeble in numbers and consideration as the avowed enemies of a monarchy then were, had it not been for their impatience at seeing him established apparently as perpetual minister.

A crisis, like that of which the republicans availed themselves so adroitly in February last, would probably have occurred earlier, had it not been for their feeble and impolitic attempt at an insurrection in May, 1839. Paris at this time was agitated by a sort of *interregnum* in the ministry, as parties were so numerous and hostile to each other, that no one of them was strong enough to form and uphold a cabinet. The most daring of the radicals thought that an insurrection under these circumstances might throw the capital into such confusion and terror, that the monarchy would be overthrown before the feebleness of the party assailing it was discovered. They had formed, some years before,

a secret society, exclusively military in character, and so constituted, that the members themselves were not to know who their officers were till the hour for action arrived. If we had not Louis Blanc's account of the matter, it would be incredible that so daring a scheme should have been entertained by a force so insignificant.

"In 1839, the association had a thousand men enrolled, and possessed twelve thousand cartridges; its leaders, unknown to itself, were Armand Barbès, a man of brilliant mind, a chivalric and heroic soul; Martin Bernard, a powerful thinker, with the courage of a Spartan; Blanqui, a conspirator born; Guignot Nêtré, and Meillard, generous and ardent spirits. We have described the frightful state of confusion under which the political world then labored. The conspirators were seized with a fatal restlessness and impatience; they longed to fight, and declared that they would separate, if the word were not given them to take up arms. Here let us pause, to remark, what melancholy liabilities those men condemn themselves to, who, having more faith in the victories of physical force than in the peaceful and inevitable conquests of intellect, make the progress of humanity a thing to be achieved by a *coup de main*. The members of the committee felt themselves fatally entangled by circumstances. Their army was lost to them, if it did not hurry them along with it, and an iron hand drove them down a declivity, up which there is no returning after a first rash step. Here is an example which cannot be too much meditated on in our days, by so many noble young men who are the dupes of their own patriotism; for political faith has its intoxication, and devotedness its illusions." — *Ibid.*, Vol. II. pp. 588, 589.

The attempt, as might have been expected, was a wretched failure, which would have been ludicrous, if it had not cost several valuable lives. Among others, a young officer named Drouineau was shot by the insurgents under circumstances which made his death appear like an act of assassination. "The people had manifested surprise and curiosity, and that was all. The few pedestrians in the street made way for the insurgents, and gazed after them with astonishment and dread." The government showed its usual clemency or weakness, on the trial of the prisoners. Only the two leaders, Barbès and Blanqui, were condemned to death, and their sentence was subsequently commuted by the king himself, in opposition, as it was said, to the advice of his ministers, to transportation; about forty of their companions

were sentenced to imprisonment for different terms of years. This rash attempt was so generally reprobated, that the party was compelled to remain in obscurity and inaction for several years ; yet the leaders of it gained so great popularity among the ardent republicans, that they have wielded great power in Paris since the revolution of February, and came very near breaking up the executive government, and dispersing the National Assembly. The republic itself was obliged to proceed severely against those men to whom, more than to any others, it owed its being ; at the last accounts, they were prisoners of state at Vincennes. To this French republic, then, as well as to its predecessor of 1792, may be applied Vergniaud's celebrated remark, that "the Revolution, like Saturn, has begun to devour its own children."

We have briefly adverted to these details only to show how insignificant and powerless was the republican party during the whole reign of Louis Philippe, and that the great body of the French people, however they might dislike the personal character of the king, or have cause to complain of the conduct of the administration, were perfectly satisfied with their form of government, and, far from wishing, were even in dread of any change. The party manœuvres of the dynastic opposition, exasperated by the long continuance of M. Guizot in power, and therefore disposed to seek for aid wherever it might be found, all parliamentary attacks upon the ministry being found unavailing, brought this handful of desperate men again into notice, and eventually, though by accident, gave them the means of prostrating the monarchy. Barrot, Duvergier de Hauranne, Crémieux, and, though more cautiously, Thiers himself, resolved to agitate the country on the question of electoral reform. In the session of 1846, when allusion was made to this topic, Guizot had tauntingly told them that the people did not desire such a reform, as no petitions for it had been presented. As direct political meetings were prohibited because they had been so often made a cloak for insurrections, they prepared to hold a series of banquets in different parts of the country, at which the toasts and speeches should bear entirely on the matter of the representation in the Chamber. This scheme was carried into effect, the *banquets* being very much after the model of the *monster meetings* in Ireland, though

they were by no means so well attended, the number of guests being usually from five to twelve hundred. Still, the opposition found it difficult to act harmoniously with their republican allies. In the banquet at Lille, in November, 1847, a majority of the committee were found to be declared republicans, and when a toast pledging them to support the institutions founded in 1830 was rejected, Barrot, Crémieux, and other members of the Chamber, retired in disgust. The banquet at Dijon was still more radical, and was therefore as severely blamed by the opposition as by the conservatives. These men did not understand that they were calling up a spirit which they would have no power to exorcise; on occasions of popular agitation, the most violent and daring always take the lead, and soon obtain the entire control.

The severe allusion to these banquets in the king's speech, on the opening of the Chambers in December, 1847, and the great majority which supported the address that echoed this condemnation of them, increased the fury of the opposition, as it was clear that the ministry were firm, and that there was no chance of unseating them by parliamentary weapons alone. They resolved, therefore, though with hesitation and many misgivings, to agitate the people still further. Hitherto, the banquets had been held only in the provinces, and after all the inflammatory speeches that had been made at them, not more than 200,000 persons, out of a population of more than thirty-four millions, had been induced to petition for reform. But the Parisians were more excitable and dangerous, and so it was determined to hold a monster banquet in the capital, to be preceded by a grand procession, — a measure which was almost sure to bring the republicans into open revolt. It was remembered that the insurrection of 1832 had grown out of the immense funeral *cortège* of General Lamarque, and the more terrible rebellion at Lyons, two years afterwards, out of a grand banquet given to the elder Garnier Pagès. The mere announcement of a great popular demonstration was enough to cause the desperate republicans to furbish up their arms, and concert all the measures necessary for the overthrow of the monarchy. The ministers, if they wished to prevent a frightful effusion of blood, had no choice left but to prohibit the meeting, which they did, in virtue of a law passed in 1791. This step made the opposition furious, and they declared their

intention to join the procession in a body, and thus sanction the meeting by the presence of many deputies and a few peers, in spite of the ministerial prohibition, which they assumed to be illegal. Here a question of law was presented, and as the courage of Barrot and his party began to waver before the appointed day, since a great majority of them did not desire a revolution, it enabled them to hit upon a compromise with the ministers. It was agreed that the procession should be given up, but that the banquet might be held without forcible interference, though the guests should be formally warned, at the time, of its illegality, so that the question might subsequently be tried at the legal tribunals.

If this course had been persisted in, the affair might have ended without creating any public disturbance. But the republicans, who, by acting hitherto in concert with the opposition, had now to some extent the direction of the matter, were determined that it should not go off so quietly. Without consulting their allies, the day before the banquet was to take place they issued an announcement, — written, it is said, by Marrast, the editor of the *National*, who probably acted in concert with Lamartine, Crémieux, Ledru-Rollin, and a very few other republican deputies, — not only that a procession would be formed, but inviting the National Guards and the students of the colleges to take their places in it, and marshalling them so that the Guards, though without arms, should appear to surround and escort the other portions of the assemblage. The plan was a very skilful one, for the government dared not provoke any collision of the troops of the line with the National Guards, who were in fact the chief support of the monarchy; and though but a small portion of this civic militia would probably obey such an irregular summons, a few of them skilfully distributed round the procession would effectually shield it from an attack by the regular soldiery. The superior officers of the Guards who might join them were to form the front rank of the *cortége*. But the whole proceeding was in direct contravention of law, as the National Guards could not be called out but by the proper authorities. The ministers consequently issued a proclamation, prohibiting the meeting and the banquet altogether; and when they communicated this fact to the Chamber, Odillon Barrot disavowed, for him-

self and his associates, the language used in Marrast's announcement, and intimated their intent to obey the proclamation, though he protested generally against the policy of the ministers.

Out of doors, when these facts became known, great agitation ensued. The opposition met on Monday evening at Barrot's house, and had a stormy discussion; Lamartine, Ledru-Rollin, and others, persisted in their determination to join the procession and the banquet, and to set the government and the laws at defiance. The minds of the republicans were made up; judging that the populace was now sufficiently excited, they were resolved to try the chances of a conflict in the streets, the issue of which should determine the fate of royalty in France. But the moderate party, led by Barrot, prevailed by a great majority, and they decided to give up the banquet, but on the morrow to impeach the ministers, — a step which it was known could lead to no effectual result, and which was adopted only to cover their retreat. The *National* of the next morning was furious: — "The dynastic opposition retreats; it retreats after having proclaimed the right, after entering into a solemn engagement to defend it, after publishing the announcement of its resolution, after having incited the people to join in a manifestation which should be equally glorious and efficacious." The republicans had no thought of retreating.

We need not enter into any detail of the events of the three days. On Tuesday, the excitement was not at all general, and the National Guard was not called out till late in the afternoon; mobs had collected in several of the streets, and some barricades were erected, but the troops met with little opposition in dispersing the one and removing the other. The soldiers and the populace showed great forbearance, and but little blood was shed. On the morning of Wednesday, affairs looked more serious. The streets had been guarded by strong patrols during the night, but some barricades were yet standing, with a show of more obstinate defence; organized bands of insurgents appeared, and some bloody collisions took place between them and the Municipal Guards, a sort of police force, which was an object of great dislike to the people. The National Guard seem to have taken no active part on either side, though some of the battalions had a mutinous aspect, many uttered the popular watchword for reform, and

deputations came from one or two of the legions to ask for the removal of the ministers. The king's heart failed him, and early in the afternoon he announced to M. Guizot that the ministry must be changed, and that M. Molé should be his successor. Under the circumstances, of course, this was a pledge that the desired reform should be granted ; and it was so understood, both in the Chamber, where the conservative majority showed great indignation at the dismissal of Guizot, and in Paris, where the news caused general rejoicing. The fighting instantly ceased at all points to which information of the change was brought, save at a few barricades which were guarded by the republican faction in the streets where the strength of this party lay ; these refused to put aside their arms, though no one attacked them. The funds rose, the city was illuminated as soon as evening came on, the popular combatants dismissed the prisoners they had made, and rejoicing crowds once more thronged the Boulevards in search of amusement, or to congratulate each other on the events of the day. Every thing announced that the contest had ended, and that the government and the people were again moving in harmony together.

The republicans were dismayed that the affair had terminated so easily ; but they resolved to make one more effort to provoke a contest between the soldiers and the populace. About ten o'clock in the evening, a strong column, composed chiefly of workmen from the Faubourgs, moved in regular order down the Boulevards, and after turning aside for a few minutes to the office of the *National*, whence they were harangued from a window by M. Marrast, they proceeded to the Hotel of Foreign Affairs. This was guarded by a strong detachment of soldiers, and as the insurgent column approached, before any parley could take place, a shot was fired by one of the mob, which wounded the horse of the officer who commanded the troops, and killed a soldier who was near him. Following the impulse of the moment, the officer rashly gave the word to fire, and a general volley swept the street. As the ranks of the military extended across the whole breadth of the Boulevards, and the soldiers, indignant at such an unprovoked attack, probably took good aim, the discharge was very fatal. More than sixty fell, either killed or wounded, and the insurgents instantly dispersed. But they had attained their object.

In less than an hour, seventeen of the corpses were collected, and being arranged in a cart, were carried through the principal streets, followed by a large body of republican workmen clamoring for vengeance. The procession stopped, as before, at the office of the *National*, and at that of the *Réforme*, to hear exciting speeches from Marrast, Flocon, and Garnier Pagès. Then, the multitude increasing at every step, the ghastly spectacle was carried on. The effect of this well-managed scene, which shows the cool deliberation and determined purpose of its contrivers, was great and immediate. The Parisian populace, the most excitable of any in the world, were urged to desperation by it, while the better classes, who were numerous enough still to have prevented the matter from coming to extremities, if they had retained their courage, were overwhelmed with terror. More than two thousand barricades were erected in the course of the night, and all preparations were made for a desperate struggle on the morning of Thursday. But the vacillation of the aged king and the cowardice of his sons prevented any considerable effusion of blood. The fierce leaders of the republican party could be overcome only by measures as resolute and daring as their own. The troops of the line seem to have remained faithful to the last, as there is no evidence that a single company of them actually joined the insurgents, while the garrison of the Château d'Eau, composed of one hundred and fifty soldiers, maintained their post with unflinching gallantry, till they were butchered to a man. Even the National Guards, where they were drawn up under their officers, either waited for orders or remained neutral, though a number of them, as individuals, joined the revolt. But the king and his sons remained passive in the Tuileries, hearing the exaggerated reports that were brought to them of the force of the insurrection, and thinking only of conciliation when the hour called for arms. Thiers and Barrot were appointed ministers, as the last hope of saving the dynasty; but their measures only precipitated its fall. General Bugeaud was ordered to give up the command of the troops, which he had retained up to this moment, waiting only for the order to act, and the monarchy grounded arms before the people.

Still, if the choice had remained to the Deputies, the National Guard, or even to the general will of the people, the house of Orleans might have continued on the throne. But

the armed and triumphant republicans gave neither of these bodies any time to deliberate or opportunity to manifest their wishes. Having concerted all their measures beforehand, the leaders of the revolt sent one strong detachment of their irregular forces to get possession of the Chamber of Deputies, another to seize the Hôtel de Ville, and a third, the most disorderly and violent of all, to frighten the royal family out of the Tuileries. At each of these points, the affair was decided by their threats and vociferations. At the Chamber, only Ledru-Rollin and Lamartine were allowed to speak, and they read a list — previously prepared, of course — nominating themselves with five other Deputies as members of a Provisional Government, the shouts of a mob confirming the appointment. From the office of the *Réforme* newspaper, another list was sent out, including only four of those Deputies who were nominated in the Chamber, and adding to them five others, three of whom were — editors of republican newspapers. This list was signed by that Caussidière who has been recently expelled from office as a conspirator against the National Assembly, and it modestly announced that it was the will of the people that the persons named in it should constitute the Provisional Government. When these self-appointed governors met to deliberate at the Hôtel de Ville, a compromise was made between the two parties, at first by choosing four of the newspaper set to be secretaries to the other body, but a few days afterwards by admitting these four to full membership, the decrees being signed by the whole number without distinction. Here, also, after a mock deliberation of a few hours, under the menaces and shouts of a vast mob which filled the Place, these eleven men issued a proclamation, “in the name of the French people,” declaring that royalty was abolished, and a republic instituted in its place.

It is impossible to read even this brief summary of the events of the revolution without perceiving that it did not proceed from the people of France, taken as a whole, or from any considerable portion of them, that it was not sanctioned even by a majority of the population of Paris, but was the result of a contest between three political parties, neither of them very considerable in numbers, — the ministerialists, the dynastic opposition, and the republicans. In this contest, the party which was least numerous and least respectable obtained, by

its superior tactics and greater energy and daring, a signal triumph. It borrowed the weapons of the opposition only to beat that party down with them, and to involve the government and the monarchy in their ruin. One cannot help pitying MM. Thiers and Barrot, in their vain attempt, on Thursday, to form a ministry and pacify the insurgents, or, at a later hour, to have the Duchess of Orleans acknowledged as regent, and themselves, of course, as her advisers and principal agents. They had attempted to play with the edged tools of republicanism, and found that they had only cut their own fingers with them. The victors did right scornfully to refuse their aid or coöperation after the battle was won. Even such journalists as Marrast and Flocon might reject them as associates, after they had "backed out" of the affair of the banquet, and refused to second the manlier policy of Ledru-Rollin and Lamartine.

If the members of the self-appointed government had had any confidence in the general desire of the people for a republic, they would have limited their duties to the mere routine of office, doing just enough to keep the wheels of government in motion and preserve the public tranquillity, but leaving all important projects and reformatations untried till the will of the nation could be ascertained, and the new institutions of state organized by those to whom power had been formally delegated for that end. But audacity and recklessness had been their only principles of action, the alpha and omega of their political creed. They knew well enough that they had overthrown the monarchy, and gathered the reins of government into their own hands, only by stratagem and surprise, which were fearlessly executed under their direction by desperate men who had nothing to lose but their lives. Their first care, therefore, was to burn the bridge behind the people,—to commit both the capital and the country so deeply to a republican policy, that a retreat should be impossible. One of their announcements, on the first day of their existence, was, "The Provisional Government has taken all the necessary measures to render impossible the return of the ancient dynasty, or the advent of a new one"; and though they had done nothing then to justify this boast, they proceeded rapidly to make the promise good.

They dared not trust the National Guard, the best institution that France had inherited from the former republic, as it

was composed exclusively of the middle classes, and had now enrolled in it nearly 60,000 of the most reputable citizens, all of whom had property and intelligence enough to make them strongly interested in the preservation of order. But this civic militia had remained almost entirely neutral in the contest, and would be likely to offer a strenuous opposition to any measures tending to break up the usual course of manufactures and trade, and to render the laboring classes entirely dependent on the state for support. The new government, consequently, though they endeavoured to wheedle and flatter this powerful corps, so as to induce them to accede to the revolution, sought to deprive them at once of all power of separate and efficient action by amalgamating with them large masses of the populace, who were armed at the public expense. To the citizens of Paris they said, "Organize yourselves, form patrols, mingle with the National Guard"; to the Guard themselves, — we still quote from their proclamations of the first day, — they announced, "At the present hour, all the citizens form part" of your body. To make these general invitations effective, they soon organized what they called the *Garde Mobile*, greatly exceeding the National Guard in number, and in which the latter body was soon merged, the united corps counting over 200,000 men, the additions being from the lowest ranks of the populace. If they had really desired the peace and tranquillity of the capital, — and they avowed no other purpose, — was this the mode to gain their end, to arm the most ignorant, factious, and turbulent classes against the sedate citizens, the shopkeepers and others possessing a small capital, who had no political objects to obtain, and wished for nothing but quiet and liberty to pursue their usual avocations? Or could they accuse the *bourgeois* National Guard of aristocratic prejudices, or of oppressive conduct towards the poor, when the only test for admission into this body, besides the proper age and residence, was the ability of a person to furnish himself with arms and a uniform?

The next step of the Provisional Government, still in their first day of office, was to take all possible security for their own lives amid the awful surges of the revolution which they had themselves excited, by abolishing the punishment of death for political offences. This in appearance was an act of clemency, and if it had come from a regularly constituted government, holding its post either by prescriptive right or

popular election, it would have merited praise. But the measure was properly legislative, not executive, in character, and these self-appointed rulers had no more right to enact, than any of the hundred popular clubs which instantly sprang up in Paris had to annul it. Besides, this was no time to relax, but to tighten, the bonds and guaranties of order, when those who were turbulently disposed had arms in their hands, were in the first flush of their newly won success, and had nothing but an improvised and illegal government to control them. The violent and riotous had no stake in the commonwealth, and risked nothing but their heads by any outbreak ; to promise them immunity in this respect was almost to offer a bounty for insurrection. And so it has proved ; for during the two months and a half of the reign of these eleven men, one revolt followed another in quick succession at Paris, each time bringing the self-appointed authorities within a hair's breadth of destruction ; now, they were obliged to call out the armed populace to defend them against the National Guard, who resented that amalgamation of another force with themselves which deprived them of their power to protect the peace of the city ; and almost the next day, they had to beat the *rappel* for the Guard to save them from the people of the Faubourgs. Who can wonder that under these circumstances general consternation seized upon the capital, that the foreigners who were wont to contribute so largely to its wealth departed, the wealthy citizens fled, trade and manufactures were paralyzed, and the laborers who were thrown out of employ clamored for the government to redeem its magnificent promises to them, and to save them from the consequences of their own victory ? It reminds one of the extravagance and fanaticism of the old Jacobin times, to find the radical newspapers expressing great offence at this desertion of the city by the rich, and striving to exasperate the populace against them by imputing it to a conspiracy against the revolution. It is lucky that there are no noble and privileged classes now, against whom the blame may be directed.

We have spoken of the *reign* of the Provisional Government, though, with reference to the whole body of the French people, it might more properly be called a despotism ; for it was instituted over them by stratagem and violence, against the will of a majority even of the citizens of Paris, and instead of contenting itself with mere executive functions, and

calling an assembly to ascertain the wishes of the nation, it arrogated to itself all powers, administrative, legislative, and judicial. It exercised this usurped authority with the widest license, often issuing a dozen decrees at a session, some of which went to change the fundamental laws of the state and to loosen the very foundations of society, while others directed the order of some trumpery shows at a festival got up to amuse the populace, and others again decided the color of a flag or prescribed the fashion of a waistcoat. Nothing can exceed the presumption of ignorance, or the elation of theorists who find themselves suddenly lifted from obscurity to the temporary control of the fortunes of a great empire, and endued with absolute power to reduce their fine-spun speculations to practice. The only merit to which they aspired was that of carrying forward the revolution and making a reaction impossible, and of making the influence of the new ideas in politics which had originated at Paris felt in other lands ; though for the magnitude of this last effect the Provisional Government can take no other kind of credit to itself than a mischievous child does, who, by meddling with a steam-engine at work, has caused a frightful explosion. Paris almost casually fired a train which communicated with a powder-magazine in nearly every city in Europe.

We need not follow in detail all the measures of these new governors, by which they sought to bind for ever to their own support the rabble whom they had armed against the *bourgeoisie*, to anticipate the labors of the duly appointed founders of the constitution, and to render the maintenance of a republic, *as they understood it*, a matter of necessity instead of choice to the French people. Most of those which were not required by any immediate exigency were of such a nature, that they could not be repealed or modified, or even remain as they were, not carried out by similar steps or supported by subsequent measures pointing the same way, without occasioning boundless irritation. They forestalled all the great questions of government, and left the assembly which they called nothing to do but to finish their work. They pledged it irrevocably, not only to the organization and support of a republic and the propagandism of democratic opinions, but to a social revolution. Though professing a great regard for the peace of Europe, they declared that the treaties of 1814 and 1815 were abrogated and no longer binding

upon the nation, so that France was free at any moment to reclaim those provinces of which she had been deprived at the fall of Napoleon. This might be understood, either as a significant hint of the nature of the pretensions which they should make in case of war, or as an incitement to the people to put forth an immediate claim for the possession of their former boundaries.

Acting as consuls to whom unlimited power had been granted in order that they might provide for the safety of the republic, they proceeded to carry their own theories into effect, and to organize society on a new basis. In one decree, they destroyed the independence of the judiciary, saying that it was not democratic for persons to hold office on any other tenure than the pleasure of the people; and in another they declared their intention to confiscate all the railroads in France, and actually seized upon one of them, on the plea that the directors of a private company were not competent for its management. They converted the Tuileries into a hospital where invalid artisans and laborers should be supported at the public expense, and ordered that all goods left at the pawnbroking establishments for the loan of small sums should be returned to their owners, the government paying the amount for which they were pledged. They abolished all titles and nobility, and ordered the release of all prisoners who were confined for debt. They determined the number of hours which should constitute a day's work, giving an advantage of one hour to the laborers in Paris over those in the provinces. Though the finances were in the utmost disorder, they abrogated the stamps on newspapers and the salt duties, two of the most productive branches of revenue, and ordered discount banks to be established in the principal cities for the purpose of lending small sums on nominal security. They decreed the abolition of slavery in all the colonies of France, cutting short all debate about apprenticeship as a preparation for freedom, and leaving the matter of compensation to the owners to be settled by the future assembly. They opened national workshops for laborers who were out of employment, and established public schools, on the model of the *École Polytechnique*, for teaching administrative politics to the people. They confiscated the whole property of the Orleans family, and ordered the crown jewels and royal forests to be sold to defray the ex-

penses of the state. Commissioners of government, like the Jacobin proconsuls of 1792, were sent into the various departments, *with unlimited powers*, all the military being put at their disposition, to change the prefects and sub-prefects, and to dismiss the mayors, adjuncts, and municipal councils whom they might find, or choose to imagine, hostile to the republic; and they were particularly charged to attend to the coming elections, and take care that only proper persons were returned to the assembly. One of these republican proconsuls distinguished himself at Lyons by decreeing that no person should be permitted to leave the city with more than 500 francs in specie in his pocket; and his conduct in other respects was so outrageous, that, after once or twice rebelling against his authority, the inhabitants succeeded in expelling him from the city.

A few of these measures, perhaps, were wise and humane, though we doubt if one of them could have passed in the most popular legislative assembly that was ever collected in France without much opposition and debate. Certainly, not one of them was of that urgent and immediate necessity which required it to be passed before the deliberate will of the nation could be made known through its duly accredited representatives. All of them had it for their evident object to establish the self-appointed government in unbounded popularity with the lowest orders of the people, and to render it impossible for the assembly, when it came together, to take a single retrograde step, or disavow one of their proceedings, without incurring imminent peril. We say nothing of the decree constituting the National Assembly in a single chamber, composed of nine hundred representatives, elected by universal suffrage, and paid at the rate of twenty-five francs a day to each member; though the policy of placing the legislature on a footing so extravagantly democratic, in the present excited condition of France and of all Europe, could not be defended for a moment. It was necessary to call an assembly of one kind or another, to determine the number of representatives and the mode in which they should be chosen; and we are not now blaming the Provisional Government for what they were obliged to do, although they did it very ill. Even the manner of their own appointment may escape censure, though they certainly forestalled the action of the insurgents by nominating them-

selves, and asking the mob to ratify, not to make, the choice. This was a usurpation, but in some sort a necessary one, as all legitimate authority had been scattered to the winds. But for a government resting on so flimsy a basis to proceed at once, and almost at random, to alter all the institutions of state, to legislate, not only for France, but for the East and West Indies, to impose and repeal taxes, to confiscate vast amounts of private property, to destroy the very foundation of the judiciary, to impose upon the nation at large the burden of giving a free maintenance to one large class of the population, and by all these means to bind for ever to their own support the populace of one great city, putting arms into their hands, at the public expense, to make that support effectual, is a more flagrant instance of the usurpation and abuse of despotic authority than can be found in all history. If this is republicanism, we pray heartily that mankind may be delivered from it for ever.

The great mistake of these men and their republican adherents has arisen from their inability to see the difference between 1791 and 1848 in the situation of France and the condition of her people. They have played off all the airs of the former revolution in a manner which would be ludicrous, if it were not dangerous and criminal. They have endeavoured to imitate the despotic rule, the terrible energy and audacity, of the Jacobins, and have only succeeded in caricaturing them. At the former period, an intolerable load of oppression and abuse was to be shaken off, the wrongs of centuries were to be redressed, a great foreign invasion was to be resisted, and the bulk of the people were to be raised out of an abyss of suffering and degradation. The greatness of the occasion showed itself alike in the almost superhuman exertions and the monstrous crimes which it provoked. Feudalism and aristocracy were beaten down and crushed, never to rise again in France. The throne, indeed, was restored, but only to be surrounded by democratic institutions. A new generation has grown up in the largest enjoyment of political privileges, of entire toleration of opinion, and of all the means of social welfare.

Property is distributed among them with a closer approach to absolute equality than in any country in the world, and cannot be reduced still nearer to a level without destroying the institution itself. The statistics given in a preceding arti-

cle show that two thirds of the whole French people are proprietors of land, most of them cultivating their own small farms ; and one half of the remaining third own stock in trade, or other capital, so that but one sixth of the total population are dependent entirely on wages. A single comparison, which we find in a recent work on institutions of beneficence in Paris, shows what an immense improvement has taken place in the condition of the laboring classes in the capital. In the seventh year of the former republic, the number of indigent persons in the city exceeded 124,000 ; in 1844, it was but 66,000, though meanwhile the whole population of Paris has more than doubled. Yet Louis Blanc and his disciples, among whom, we are sorry to perceive from his later writings, is Lamartine himself, preach about the necessity of a new organization of labor, and of a grand effort on the part of the state to relieve the artisans and laborers from the hardness and misery of their condition ! It seems that the French operatives themselves are beginning to understand and deride this silly and expensive project ; one of them, who is a member of the new assembly, lately ridiculed it there with great effect. Were it introduced into England and Ireland, indeed, the world would have nothing to say against the experiment ; it is from the appalling accounts of the destitution and numbers of the English and Irish poor that these French politicians have borrowed all their facts and their rhetoric.

The Provisional Government, then, have greatly deceived themselves in their estimate of the comparative numbers of the *bourgeoisie* and the working classes. They have caused the revolution to depend entirely upon the latter for support, and to take a hostile attitude towards the former, and they find to their astonishment that they are in a small minority. The National Assembly has come together, with its 900 members chosen from all France by universal suffrage, and in spite of all the efforts of Ledru-Rollin's proconsuls, it turns out, to the consternation of the radicals, that a large majority of them are conservatives. The *Réforme*, and the *Courier Français*, which is said to be the especial organ of the former minister of the interior, are furious at this disappointment ; the latter exclaimed, on the 1st of May, — "Conservatives, favorers of the former dynasty, and legitimists will compose a majority of the Assembly ; this is an insult to the

Revolution. [It is the fashion to personify revolutions in France ; that of 1791 was even canonized long ago by the republican party.] The toleration, the extreme weakness, of the government which grew out of the barricades has favored the projects of the enemies of the people and of justice. [Lamartine and his colleagues would not always go as fast or as far as Ledru-Rollin and Louis Blanc wished.] Those who wish for privileges, who would recall dynasties, are to crowd the legislative halls, and will dare, perhaps, to raise their banners there, in the hope of crushing by their numbers the too few representatives of the democracy."

Well, — why should they not, if all France, whose representatives they certainly are, so wills it ? The true republican doctrine, as we in this country understand it, requires implicit submission, in all matters of government, to the will of the greatest number. The policy of the republican party in France for the last eighteen years has been to create dissension and hostility between the *bourgeoisie* and the classes who subsist entirely on wages, the latter being honored by them with the exclusive appellation of "the people." These were expected to do all the fighting in a revolution ; their recklessness and love of change, their excitable and daring temperament, being supposed to compensate their inferiority of numbers. But the politicians did not make allowance enough for the rapid diminution of this class during the present century, and for the change effected in them by the increase of their wages, and the greater ease and comfort of their social position. Many desperate men are still to be found among them ; but they are no longer formidable from their immense multitude. Thus, in the outbreak of the 15th of May, when the radicals attempted to disperse the new National Assembly, and give to the mob of Paris again the exclusive control of the nation for months, if not for years, they looked to see the armed populace of the Faubourgs appear by tens of thousands, as in 1791, when suffering and famine had made them fierce and invincible. But the conspirators could bring together only a contemptible mob, counted by hundreds rather than thousands, who dispersed at the first appearance of the *bourgeoisie* in arms. Nothing but the feebleness and timidity of the executive government, and the treachery of several of its officers, if not of its members, gave the insurgents a chance of success.

The republican leaders have all along complained, that the revolution of July, 1830, was really effected by "the people," who bore the brunt of the contest, and sacrificed their lives, while the middle classes, who had remained quiet in the hour of danger, came forward when the victory was obtained, and stole from the real combatants all the fruits of success. "The people" were pacified by fair words, and Louis Philippe was placed on the throne by a political juggle. The monarchy of July, says Louis Blanc, "properly speaking, has been but the reign of the *bourgeoisie*." Admitting all this, as it is certainly a near approach to the truth, we still ask, — What then? The army which fought the battles of the American Revolution was not permitted to determine the future form of government for the country, or to elect its rulers. Constitutions were adopted, legislators and executive officers were chosen, by the whole body of the population; any other mode of effecting these ends being wholly inconsistent with republicanism. According to Louis Blanc, and his late associates in the Provisional Government, "the people" is a phrase which means nothing but the lowest populace of Paris and the other large cities of France. We will borrow his own definitions of the two classes who have been contending with each other during the last eighteen years for the control of the state.

"The *bourgeoisie* is the whole body of those citizens who, possessing instruments of labor or a capital, can develop their powers and resources without incurring servitude, and are dependent on others only to a certain extent.

"The *people* is the whole body of citizens who, not possessing the instruments of labor, do not find in themselves the means of their development, and are dependent on others in what regards the prime necessities of life."

The humble artisan, therefore, who by toil and economy has saved enough to purchase a set of tools, and set up for himself, is no longer one of "the people," but becomes a member of that hated *bourgeoisie*, — the shopkeepers, traders, master mechanics, and small capitalists, — who, in the revolution of 1848, occupy the place which kings, nobles, and other privileged classes did in that of 1789! These are the tyrants, the oppressors, who have been put down by "the three glorious days of February," and over whom is established "the reign of the people," consisting exclusively

of the proletaries of Paris, who have nothing but stout arms, furious passions, reckless bravery, and an inclination to get up a new revolution once a month, and to be supported in national workshops at the expense of the state. If they succeed in an outbreak, they are rewarded by a series of popular *fêtes*, by the eloquent thanks of republican orators and statesmen, and by medals and pensions; if they fail, according to the late law they cannot lose their heads, and they have nothing else to lose; imprisonment is nothing to them, as in a few weeks another revolution may open their prison-doors, and then they will be the martyrs of liberty, and enjoy the same honors with Barbès, Blanqui, Cabet, and others, who have thrice distinguished themselves in this way within a short period. What a caricature of "a people fighting for their freedom" is this! What a bitter satire on the cause of republican institutions, as compared with the government of nobles and kings!

It is evident that the two definitions given apply to the civic population alone, and thus the author, with his republican brethren, wholly ignores the existence of twenty-four millions of persons, or more than two thirds of the whole nation, who are engaged in agriculture. There are but six cities in France, each of which contains upwards of a hundred thousand inhabitants; their aggregate population does not amount to two millions, of which number Paris contains nearly one half. "The people," according to Louis Blanc's definition, are surely a small minority even in Paris, the *bourgeoisie* and upper classes taken together outnumbering them by at least seven to one. To these add the vast number of small landed proprietors and cultivators, whose interests and political inclinations certainly coincide with those of the *bourgeoisie*, and we see a very evident reason why the latter class have in fact governed France under Louis Philippe, and are even now struggling to throw off the intolerable yoke of despotism and terror which has been fastened upon them by the lowest populace of Paris and Lyons through the late revolution. The recent elections to the Assembly, if other proof were wanting, have demonstrated the immense numerical superiority of this conservative portion of the population. In spite of the prevalence of excitement and alarm, and the violent measures of Ledru-Rollin's commissioners, conservative delegates have been

chosen all over the country by overwhelming majorities. Those from La Vendée, it is said, are royalist to a man, while full two hundred are returned who were members of the former Chamber of Deputies, the body which was declared not to represent the feelings and interests of France, and in which, certainly, the republican party did not exceed forty. And all this, be it remembered, is the result of an election by universal suffrage. If France could be fairly polled, there can be no doubt that a great majority of the nation would vote for the instant restoration of the monarchy.

Unfortunately, the proper *bourgeoisie* are timid even to cowardice, deficient in energy and resolution, and have no *esprit de corps*; while the multitude of peasant proprietors care nothing about politics. Both of these classes wish for quiet, order, and freedom to manage their own concerns, and they are willing to pay allegiance to any government which will secure to them the enjoyment of these things. Thus they submitted to Louis Philippe, without applauding him, or even caring for him; for one consequence of the frequent revolutions that have taken place in France during the last sixty years is, that the feeling of loyalty, by which we understand an affectionate attachment, founded on old associations, to the existing form of government, whether it be royal, aristocratic, or republican, has completely died out. This sort of loyalty is the true guaranty of tranquillity and political welfare, the proper basis of patriotism, "the cheap defence of nations"; it is the slow growth of centuries, but it will infallibly spring up with time, if the government be not constantly teasing and oppressive, or the people suffering greatly in their social condition. It exists already to some extent in our own republic, its objects being the Union and the Federal Constitution; and if these institutions can withstand the fury of party spirit and the madness of political fanaticism for half a century longer, it will have anchored them in the hearts of the people for ever.

In France, strange as the assertion may seem under present circumstances, the bulk of the people care very little about political freedom. They are vain, impulsive, passionately fond of military renown, and they prize the power and glory of their country above all personal considerations, or rather because they consider their country as a part of themselves. Flatter their national pride by military successes

and foreign conquests, and they will submit to any restrictions on their political privileges and personal freedom. This was the secret of Napoleon's power ; his government, at least while the empire lasted, was an unmixed despotism, hardly a decent respect being paid to the forms of liberty, and the press being subjected to entire restraint. Still, his rule was popular, and remained so till his continued wars had decimated the population, and introduced mourning into almost every family in the land. And even now, when the lapse of a generation has effaced the memory of the private sorrows that he caused, his name is a potent spell to conjure with, all his faults being forgotten in the splendor of his achievements, and the renown that he acquired for France. Lamartine knew his countrymen well, when, in his report to the National Assembly on the state of the republic, he said nothing of commercial failures, nothing of the desertion of Paris by the better classes, nothing of the ruin of the finances, nothing of the constant commotions in all the large cities, but drew a brilliant picture of the effect which the revolution in France had produced throughout Italy and Germany. If his glowing rhetoric could be trusted, not a cloud remained in the horizon ; never before had the glory and influence of France been so conspicuous ; under her auspices, liberty, equality, and fraternity were beginning their reign upon the earth.

Yet a series of alarming insurrections had just marked the close of the elections, and the parricidal hands of the infant republic had been deeply stained with the blood of that very class of citizens to whom she owed her birth. Frantic at the signal defeat which they had experienced at the polls, the republican party had rushed to arms in nearly all the large cities, and endeavoured again by their audacity and desperate courage to make up for their lack of numbers. At Lille, Limoges, Rouen, and other places, barricades had been erected, and the National Guards had triumphed over the insurgents only after a bloody conflict. The *émeute* at Limoges proceeded from the defeat at the elections of two teachers of communism, Villegoureix and Dussoubs-Gaston, who had been attempting for two years to propagate the doctrines of Pierre Leroux in the city. They had made many enthusiastic converts among the rabble ; but the citizens who had something to lose, and whose property was menaced while

their opinions were outraged by the diffusion of such doctrines, were far too numerous for them, even when all the adult males were allowed to vote. The radicals were defeated, they immediately rose in insurrection, and were put down with considerable loss of life.

At Lille, which is the head-quarters of manufacturing industry in the north, and where, consequently, the working-class was relatively more numerous and more destitute than in any other part of France, the happy predominance of the *bourgeoisie* in numbers and influence was still more strikingly manifested. One of the most active and radical of the Parisian proconsuls, M. Delescluze, had been stationed there, and together with his patron, Ledru-Rollin, he was a candidate for election to the Assembly. These two received only 43,000 votes, while the successful and conservative candidates had each over 200,000. A rebellion was the immediate consequence, which was suppressed with much difficulty and bloodshed. Delescluze had rendered himself so odious, that he now thought it necessary to resign; but Ledru-Rollin, in a very flattering letter, which was published, complimented him on his energy and success in organizing the party of the republic in the north, and refused to accept his resignation.

So disastrous and unpopular, thus far, has been the course of the new republic. It is but four months old, and already more insurrections have broken out under it, and more blood has been shed, than in the last thirteen years of Louis Philippe's reign. There are now in prison at Vincennes, for conspiring against it, a large band of those who were most active and influential in establishing it upon the ruins of the monarchy. Among them is Albert, one of the members of the Provisional Government, and Louis Blanc himself is left at liberty only from a contemptuous estimate of his character and capacity to do any further harm. There, also, are Barbès, Cabet, Raspail, Hubert, Sobrier, and others, who were republican heroes and the idols of the populace but a few weeks since, and the police are nominally hunting for Blanqui. What can be done with these men? It would be quite as reasonable to put them on trial for their conduct on the 24th of February as for the events of the 15th of May. They had as good a right to disperse the only legislative assembly in France, and to make themselves members of a

Provisional Government with despotic power, on the one day as on the other. They cannot be kept much longer in prison before trial, without scandalous offence to the principles of free government ; and they cannot be set at large without imminent peril to the present constituted authorities of the republic.

We have hardly alluded to those schemes of Louis Blanc and others for a new organization of labor, and for the elevation of the laboring classes, which have played so prominent a part in the history of the revolution. It would be idle to argue against them ; a government might as well refuse to conform to the laws of gravitation or chemical affinity as to attempt to set aside the first principles of political economy. Louis Blanc would have the government monopolize all the great enterprises of industry and capital, and would render all laborers dependent upon it, securing to them uniform, abundant, and certain means of support, whatever might be their capacity, frugality, or inclination to labor. Of course, under these circumstances, they would soon cease to labor at all, and the state would be burdened with the gratuitous support of one sixth part of its population living in idleness. The enormous taxation necessary to meet this extravagant outlay would soon exhaust the means of the other five sixths of the people, and compel these also to enter the national workshops. It shows the unreflecting and headlong character of the Provisional Government, that it adopted this monstrous and nonsensical system on the first day of its own existence, and carried it out so far, that, after squandering all the money in the treasury upon it, one of the first demands which their successors were obliged to make on the National Assembly, after it came together, was for a grant of three millions to keep up the farce, the penalty of refusal being the instant dismissal to the streets of 115,000 workmen without bread or employment, their former places of occupation being shut against them through the bankruptcy or flight of their owners. That a fanatic, like Louis Blanc, or a Jacobinical conspirator and despot, like Ledru-Rollin, should take up so absurd a scheme is not surprising ; but it is humiliating to remember that men like Arago, Crémieux, and Lamartine afforded it their entire sanction and support.

The whole project is already discredited at Paris with all parties, and the only problem is how to get out of the great

difficulties which the adoption of it only for a few weeks has occasioned. In proof of this, we copy, with some abridgment, from one of the most furiously radical newspapers in France, the *Courier Français*, the following succinct and effective exposure of the absurdity of the scheme.

“We totally disapprove of the equality of wages introduced among the tailors established in the old prison of Clichy [one of the national workshops]. All that we foretold respecting this experiment has been literally verified. Activity, industry, and ability share alike with and suffer for carelessness, idleness, and incapacity. We could have wished that the president of the commission for organizing labor would renounce his project, which is inapplicable to France, impracticable now, and dangerous at any time. It is grand, it is noble, to confess that one has been mistaken. Such a confession would do honor to Louis Blanc, who probably has not the same pretensions to infallibility as the Roman pontiffs. He was the more likely to deceive himself, as he is not a practical man; and in matters of industry and trade, practice is as much superior to theory as the Alps are higher than the Pyrenees.

“The consequences of equality of wages must be to dishearten the industrious, to dissatisfy the able, to make mediocrity self-confident, and strengthen indolence in its obstinacy and its reliance on the future; the final result will be the annihilation of all emulous feeling and the destruction of every opening capacity.

“The consequences of the state’s intervention in industry and commerce, as capitalist, proprietor, legislator, and overseer, will be the successive shutting up of all private establishments, and the impossibility of opening new ones, the gradual suppression of individual liberty of trade and labor, the progress of pauperism among all citizens not included in the national workshops, and immobility in the positions and fortunes of families; the final result will be the general impoverishment of the country and the wasting away of the population.”

To remedy that portion of these predicted evils which has already come to pass is one of the heavy burdens imposed upon the National Assembly by the recklessness and folly of the Provisional Government. It was easy for the latter to court favor with the dominant mob by taking upon the government the gratuitous support of the laborers; for the scheme amounts to nothing else, as no one in the national *ateliers* really works, but those who choose to do so; leaving to their successors the sad necessity of dismissing them again to their

old habits of penury and toil, at the imminent risk of throwing the capital into agitation and revolt. It was the same policy which led them to abolish unpopular taxes by wholesale, the duty falling to the Assembly, of course, of supplying the deficit in the revenue by imposing new ones. This was their mode of taking security for the continuance of the republic, and for the growth and permanence of their own popularity. They did not anticipate the strength of the reaction which was sure to follow, when the true purport and tendency of their schemes were discovered. The *bourgeoisie* seem to be slowly awaking to the consciousness that the power is still in their own hands, on account of their immense numerical superiority ; and but for the timidity which always accompanies the possession even of very moderate wealth, they would ere now have seized the reins and held them with some show of energy. Nearly twenty years ago, on the eve of that revolution which brought him to the throne, and in view of its probable occurrence, Louis Philippe remarked to one of his friends, — “ Jacobinism is impossible, when the vast majority of the people have something to lose.” The observation did honor to his sagacity, and its truth is an element of hope for France, but of despondency for England.

It would be idle to form any conjectures respecting the future of this new French republic. That the greater part of the nation are dissatisfied with it, and heartily wish for the restoration of a monarchy, though with a more popular constitution of the legislature, and with greater safeguards for the future, there can be no doubt. Still, the Revolution must be allowed first to expend its blind force, or initial velocity ; *Nulla vestigia retrorsum* is the desperate motto of those who conspired to bring it about, and have hitherto, in the main, controlled its movements. But one after another of these persons is rapidly losing his power with the people ; and as the debilitating consequences of continued anarchy begin to show themselves, the love of peace and tranquillity will gradually lead to energetic measures for placing the government on a firm basis. One thing is certain ; the country cannot tolerate much longer a system which exposes every city in France to a desperate insurrection once a fortnight, and requires 200,000 men to remain almost constantly under arms in order to preserve the peace of the capital. Such agitating scenes are usually prolific of great men, and the appearance

of one commanding character or intellect at the present crisis might suddenly alter the complexion of affairs, and falsify all predictions as to the final result. But the movement thus far has been singularly barren in this respect ; the revolution of 1848 has not yet brought forward a Mirabeau, a Sièyes, or even a Danton ; and Lamartine is but a feeble and theatrical substitute for Lafayette. We cannot have much respect for the penetration or moral character of the man who has formally selected Robespierre for his model as a philanthropist and regenerator of society.

The great obstacle to the coexistence of free institutions in France with order, industry, and respect for law is the absorbing and despotic power of the metropolis over the provinces, and the violent, excitable, and utterly demoralized character of its population. There is no other difficulty ; there are no kings or nobles to combat, no overgrown fortunes to excite envy, no privileged classes to be humbled, no foreign enemies to encounter. There are but two classes of the population which are plainly distinguishable from each other, the *bourgeoisie* and the people, — including the peasant proprietors under the former head, and understanding the latter to comprise those only who have no resource but daily wages for their support. The interests of these two classes are closely allied by nature, and nothing but the machinations of ambitious and intriguing politicians could ever have created dissension or hostility between them. And except in Paris and Lyons, which are the hot-beds of political intrigue, it does not appear that any such enmity exists ; the two move on as harmoniously together as the two corresponding classes in this country, peace being preserved between them by the evident consideration, that each is necessary to the welfare of the other, and that the transitions of families from the one to the other, both upward and downward, are easy and frequent. But in these great cities, the rivalry of desperate politicians and fanatical speculators has kindled social dissension, and arrayed these classes of citizens in arms against each other, the control of all France being the prize of victory. Paris now resembles an intrenched camp, occupied by two hostile armies ; at any hour, the beating of the *rappel* summons the shopkeeper from his counter to take his place in the National Guard, and at the same moment the tocsin sounds, and the artisan drops his tools to seize his musket, and join in the

defence of the barricade. When these ceaseless alarms shall have produced exhaustion and weariness, the nation will gladly seek a refuge from them under the power of a military dictator.

“ Custode rerum Cæsare, non furor
Civilis aut vis exiget otium,
Non ira, quæ procudit enses,
Et miseras inimicat urbes.”

ART. VIII. — *Journal of the Rhode Island Institute of Instruction*, edited by HENRY BARNARD, Commissioner of Public Schools. Vols. I. and II. Providence : B. Cranston & Co. 1846-7.

THE State of Rhode Island has from the first been a peculiar community. The *nationality* of its people, if we may use a word that is likely to be common, has been decided and intense. While as yet its population numbered but a few hundreds, dwelling in two or three rude villages, their national spirit was altogether diverse from that of the three neighbouring Colonies. Plymouth, Massachusetts, and Connecticut differed from each other in some slight particulars ; but they were fundamentally opposed to Rhode Island, and Rhode Island was as fundamentally opposed to them. The three Colonies were founded and administered on the principle, that, as the end of man's existence is religion, therefore religion should be the end of all human institutions ; that civil government should be administered for the church, and the object for which the state should legislate most directly and most carefully should be the religious interests of the community, as comprised in their creed and conduct.

The people of Rhode Island held as fervently as their neighbours that religion was the end of human existence and of human institutions. They denied, however, that this end would be promoted by the aid or interference of the state. They contended that the state would do the highest service to religion by letting it alone, and that the only duty which it owed to the church was to secure to every man the amplest toleration in respect to his faith and worship. The original